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“NRC se Azadi”: Process, Chronology,
and a Paper Monster
Nayanika Mathur
1 On the 21st November, 2019 the Home Minister of India,  Amit Shah, announced the
extension of a nation-wide National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Parliament. Soon after
slogans  and  posters  demanding  “NRC se  azadi”  (freedom  from  the  NRC)  and  “NRC
waapis-lo” (take the NRC back) were to become central to the anti-CAA protests that
spread like wildfire across India. On the face of it, the NRC is just another bureaucratic
modality  of  identifying  and  documenting  its  citizens—a  desire  to  know  who  is  an
Indian, which has been central to the post-colonial state as it was to the colonial state
(Sriraman 2018). India is not alone in this statist drive to fully verify its citizens with
similar sorts of registers, fairly common in for instance, Western Europe. Interestingly,
the more overtly dangerous and technologically new form of identification—Aadhaar—
has not provoked a public outcry in India similar to those in other countries. If  we
compare the introduction of a biometric ID in India to other parts of the world, we see
stronger resistance and critiques with countries like the UK abandoning a comparable
biometric-based ID project. Why, then, did azadi from the NRC become so central to the
public protests? And how did this proposed register come to vocalize a wider sense of
discontentment with the politics of the contemporary Indian state?
2 In this paper, I demonstrate the need for “NRC se azadi” through recourse to two words
that  the  Home  Minister  has  used  in  his  speeches  over  2019:  “process”  and
“chronology.” While “aap chronology samjhiye” (you understand the chronology) is now
one of the more famous of Shah’s utterances; the process part is somewhat less widely
commented on. Yet, I argue that the NRC-as-process is as, if not more, sinister than the
NRC as part of a CAA-NRC chronology. 
 
NRC-as-process
3 Two aspects of the NRC are, by now, well known. The first is that Assam has served as
the laboratory of the NRC. As Suraj Gogoi has noted, “the soul of NRC is to be located in
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Assamese nationalism” and specific ideas of who belongs and does not belong to Assam.
1 Secondly,  as  many  members  and  followers  of  the  BJP  do  not  tire  of  reminding
everyone, it was a Congress-led government that had originally agreed to an NRC for
Assam in 2005 under the Assam Accord. The process only began in 2015 in earnest with
a demand made to prove—through the production of documents—that the individuals
or their  ancestors were present in India before March 24,  1971.2 By 2018 nearly 33
million people had submitted their documents (kaghaz). When the first list came out, a
staggering 4 million of them did not find their names featured in the NRC.3 In the more
recent second round 1.9 million people were left out. The processes around provision of
proof, the bureaucratic challenging of testimonies and the mistakes made, as well as
the tribunals  that  were set  up for families  and individuals  seeking inclusion in the
Assam NRC continue to be documented by certain sections of the media and research
scholars.4 The terrifying rush to produce documentary proof of being Indian rather
than an  “alien,”  the  ordeals  of  the  foreigners’  tribunals  that  those  appealing  their
exclusions  had  to  endure,  and  the  Kafkaesque  bureaucracy  that  ended  up  pushing
several  thousands  into  detention  centers  and  into  a  limbo  of  statelessness  all
demonstrate  the  monstrous  power  of  this  paper-based  register.  While  the  Assam
exercise has been shelved for  reasons that  are believed to relate to the number of
Hindu  Bengalis  who  were  left  out,  its  costs—human  lives  lost/destroyed,  anxiety
caused, time wasted, expense of conducting the exercise, use of bureaucratic labor—are
incalculable. 
4 There are some specifics to the Assam case stemming from its border with and complex
history  with  Bangladesh,  that  lend  a  particular  hue  to  the  Assam  NRC.  The wider
understanding that the current government is trying to push through is that the all-
India NRC is a different beast, so to say. In the same speech in which he proclaimed the
extension of a nation-wide NRC, Shah also said that nobody needs to be scared of the
NRC as “it is just a process.” But what sort of a bureaucratic process will the NRC be in
practice and why might it be more dangerous than any other Indian state practice of
identification or registration to-date? 
5 There are, obviously the questions of the costs of an exercise as gargantuan as the NRC
as well as of state capacity to execute it. As Niraja Gopal Jayal has noted “The Assam
NRC  is  reported  to  have  cost  ₹1,600  crore  with  50,000  officials  deployed  to  enroll
almost 3.3 crore applicants in an exercise that even its champions acknowledge to be
deeply flawed, as it ended up excluding 19 lakh people. On this basis, and taking as an
indicative number the Indian electorate of 87.9 crore, a nationwide NRC would require
an outlay of ₹4.26 lakh crore, which is more than double the presumptive loss in the 2G
scam, and four times the budgetary outlay for education this year.”5 Above all, as Jayal
has  compellingly  argued,  beyond the  prosaic  nature of  costs,  the  question  of  state
capacity, and the presence of competent bodies to undertake this bureaucratic labor, is
the question of what the moral legitimacy of such an act is. As the Indian state would
bleed  itself  dry  in  its  attempt  to  register  legitimate  citizens  and  exclude  so-called
aliens, the entire population of the state would be enacting a confounding drama of
proving they are really Indian.
6 My intention here is to conduct a little thought-experiment on what sort of processes
will be set into motion if the nation-wide NRC is, indeed, to go through. In doing, so I
draw upon my longstanding ethnographic research within small government offices
with the frontline bureaucracy in northern India (Mathur 2016). The NRC is a process
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that requires those who self-identify as citizens of this nation-state to furnish evidence
that confirms them as, indeed, Indians. What precise form this evidence—in terms of
the types of documents or “specified particulars” required to be presented—might take
for  the NRC at  the national  level  is  still  to  be  confirmed.6 If  the Assam exercise  is
anything to go by, then collecting the documents required might be an impossible task
for most of India. 
7 If  the burden of documentary proof remains as heavy as it  was in Assam, then the
critique is self-evident: most Indians—especially the poor, illiterate, women, members
of marginalized communities such as Adivasis and Dalits—do not—cannot—possess the
documents  that  prove their  citizenship.  Unable  to  provide this  documentary proof,
several millions of people would shift status, as it were, overnight from being rights-
bearing Indian citizens to stateless beings. Such massive disenfranchisement through a
reliance on evidence as impossible to provide would, surely, be a first in the history of
modern nation states anywhere in the world.
8 It is quite possible that the measure of proof demanded by the Assam NRC will not be
replicated  at  the  national  level,  not  least  because  it  has  been  widely  considered  a
colossal failure. There have been mutterings and vague declarations that this is going
to be a “simple procedure,” though what that would be remains to be seen. Let us say,
for  the  sake  of  argument,  that  the  threshold  of  proof—by which  we  mean papers,
documents,  IDs  and  other  material  artefacts  of  the  state—is  somewhat  less  of  an
impossibility than it was in the Assam case. In other words, the documents required to
allow for an individual to enter the NRC are not as stringent and arbitrary as in the
Assam case. This would still make the process of getting your name registered on the
NRC a difficult  one due to a  striking feature of  the bureaucratic  state:  its  constant




9 There is a long history to this fear of forgery and generalized doubting of documents in
India (Raman 2012). This mistrust had, paradoxically, formed the kaghazi raj or rule by
documents that has been the basis of governance in India since at least colonial times.
This is a method of rule that is predicated upon very material forms of governance—
documents and files of all sorts. It is also a form of rule by paper that is,  as I have
previously  argued,  only  being  further  strengthened  under  neoliberal  strictures  of
transparency and accountability (Mathur 2016). It was clear to me during my fieldwork
that the question of whether a document is farzi (fake) or is an asli (real) one has been a
central and constant preoccupation of almost all bureaucrats. The combination of seals,
letterheads,  stamps,  signatures,  prose-styles,  and  movement  through  appropriate
procedures and files is  what lends some reassurance to them that the document in
consideration is,  in fact, not farzi  (Hull 2012). The question of establishing authentic
proof in the form of trustworthy documents becomes particularly intense when they
are dealing with IDs or any form of documentation that confers some entitlement or
benefit to citizens (e.g. Singha 2009, Chottray and McConnell 2018). 
10 Even in cases where there are targets on local bureaucrats to expend money or confer
entitlements,  there  is  much  suspicion  of  documents  and  testimonies,  and  a  huge
reluctance to accept them as legitimate.  What then of an exercise such as the NRC
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which is almost defined by its lack of trust in the individual as a legitimate member of
the state? How much doubting will be in operation then? One of the most ominous
aspects of the NRC is that it further institutionalizes mistrust of individuals and the
doubting of documents in at least three ways. 
11 First, through the creation of a bureaucratic category of a “doubtful citizen.” We know
that  most  claims  by  citizens  of  the  state  are  immediately  regarded  with  intense
suspicion.  Even  when  the  correct  documents  are  presented  as  proof,  they  too  are
considered carefully for potential farzi-ness. Now the NRC—through rule 4(4) under the
citizenship rules laid out in the Ministry of Home Affairs order published in 20037—will
actually institutionalize such doubting by creating a term that can be conveniently and
indiscriminately  deployed.  Words  and categories  matter  profoundly  in  bureaucratic
worlds. They open up the space for an action that might not previously have existed.
12 Secondly and relatedly, there is no procedure as yet for who a doubtful citizen is and
how the Local Registrar might arrive at that conclusion. This obscurity can—and will—
be extremely dangerous as it vests huge discretionary power within the body of the
Local  Registrar  who can decide  that  someone is  doubtful  even  if  they  do  possess  the
“particulars” required. Imagine turning up with a complete file only to be told that there
is  something  dubious  about  the  documents  but  what  precisely  the  doubt  is  about
cannot be made clear. Yet, it this quite enough for an individual to be classified as a
“doubtful citizen.”
13 Thirdly, there is the further step of allowing anyone to raise an objection to your name
being added on the draft of the Local Register of Indian citizens. Such an objection can
be made within 30 days of the draft being published after which “the Subdistrict or
Taluk  Registrar  shall  consider  such  objections  and  summarily  dispose  of  the  same
within a period of ninety days.” In other words, they will have 3 months to consider the
objection to the inclusion of a name in the local register before they send it “upwards”
in the state hierarchy to the District Register, which will further move the list up to the
NRIC. Once again, we do not know on what grounds objections can or will be raised and
how the concerned official will consider the objection. What we do know is that it will
create extreme pressure on both the bureaucracy and the individuals wanting to get
their  names  registered,  adding  to  the  overall  dubiousness  of  documents  and




14 If  one  feature  of  Indian  bureaucracy  is  its  obsession  with  paperwork,  which  is
simultaneously valued and mistrusted, another one is blind proceduralism (Gupta 2012,
Sharma  and  Gupta 2006,  Mathur 2016).  No  matter how  mundane  or  ridiculous,  the
following  of  ordained  process  is  considered  the  safest  means  to  fend  off  potential
criticisms and future audits. It also serves local officials well when they are confronted,
as  is  inevitable,  with  a  barrage  of  mixed  and  contradictory  messages.  The  mixed
messaging with the NRC was already in evidence with the Home Minister noting that
there were some “communication gaps” between him and Prime Minister, Narendra
Modi. These communication gaps referred to speeches in which the two of them said
very different things with, for instance, the PM refuting the talk of an all-India NRC
being  rolled  out  soon.8 Such  contradictory  statements  and  “communication  gaps”
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where, for instance, the Home Ministry says one thing and the PMO says another are
entirely commonplace in the everyday life of the Indian state. Furthermore, as these
orders move from New Delhi to the states and then further down the state structures to
districts  and blocks,  the policies—in broken down, sequential,  do-able acts—become
even more mangled.
15 What happens when a particular bureaucratic process is initiated but the local state
finds it hard to fathom with mixed messaging—political, judicial, executive—coming in
from  all  angles?  In  my  experience,  an  obsession  with  adhering  to  the  (imagined)
stipulated procedure sets in, centered upon the production of more and more paper,
the holding of more and more meetings, and the putting together of a material—paper
—world of the state. It leads to the establishment of an alternate, sarkari (official) world
of paper that has a tenuous connection to the asli, or what is real. This is the Indian
state as a paper tiger. Such is the power of this bureaucratic logic that is tethered in
procedure, rules, paper, and a particular hierarchical following of the orders in the face
of which, as I have argued in the case of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act,
2005 (NREGA) even well-intentioned laws falter.  What then of the NRC, which is  so
patently about drawing out sharp lines of inclusion and exclusion? 
16 This strict adherence to a complex and unclear procedure with a central reliance on
documents—including  those  that  are  impossible  to  produce  and  those  that  are
considered dubious—will create havoc of a form unprecedented in the entire history of
the Indian state. We have already seen in the case of Aadhar how exclusions or faulty
operations of the ID have led to widespread suffering including hundreds of human
fatalities (Khera 2019).  The costs of being left  out of such state-ordained systems of
recognition are indescribable, especially for minorities and the poor. 
 
No Kaghaz
17 Several prominent individuals have stated that they will refuse to show their papers or
register as someone other than themselves in the NPR and/or NRC as an exercise in
civil disobedience. Much like the “NRC se azadi” slogan, the phrase “hum kaghaz nahin
dikhaenge” (we will not show our papers) also became a rallying cry for the anti-CAA
and NRC protests.9 While the intention of such an act is laudatory as in the sense of
solidarity such a public positioning is striving for, it is worth remembering that these
stances  can  only  be  adopted  by  those  who  are  in  positions  of  relative  privilege.
Additionally, it is only if a vast number of Indians—if not all of them—do agree to enter
false information or boycott the NPR-NRC processes that such forms of civil obedience
can  work.  As  it  stands  and  despite  the  impressive  numbers  of  anti  CAA  and  NRC
demonstrations that were—in pre-pandemic times—visible all over India, when and if
the NPR and NRC verification processes commence most Indians will have perforce to
participate in them. For the vast majority of Indians, especially those who have been
historically  discriminated  against  and  are  in  positions  of  structural  weakness,  the
alternative to not being entered into these registers is  not just  a  social  or political
death, but also quite possibly a literal one. 
18 Amit Shah has claimed in one TV interview that no documents will be required to be
registered for the NRC.10 Even if that were to be the case, though one cannot see how it
would be possible given the logic and structure of the Indian state, there would still be
gross exclusions from the NRC. This would involve a devolving of all power to the level
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of the Local Registrar who would then have a carte blanche to discriminate against
members  of  marginalized  or  vulnerable  communities,  such  as  Muslims,  women,
Adivasis, and Dalits. Or even if she does not belong to any of these collectives but, for
some reason, was to offend the street-level bureaucrats then she could easily be turned
away. If she were to press for grievance redress, provided such a structure were even to
be established in reality and not just on paper, then too she would face similar forms of
prejudicial treatments. This is how discrimination operates sociologically and what an




19 What of the relationship between CAA and NRC? Jayal (2019) has comprehensively laid
out why the CAA and NRC are, as she puts it, “manifestly conjoined in their objectives”
(pp. 5). The NRC can hurtle erstwhile citizens into statelessness and the confines of a
detention center.  The CAA offers citizenship to those who belong to specific  faiths,
from  which  Islam  is  most  noticeably  absent.  Jayal (2019)  has  laid  out  the
unconstitutionality of the CAA as well as the manner in which the wicked twins of CAA-
NRC have the potential to transform India “into a majoritarian polity with gradations
of  citizenship  rights  that  undermine the  constitutional  principle  of  universal  equal
citizenship” (pp. 5). This precise potential was made crystal clear in a word that Amit
Shah himself used in a speech he gave— “chronology.” More precisely, Shah said at a
political  rally:  “aap chronology samajhiye” (you please understand the chronology) in
which he clearly linked the CAA and the NRC together.11 If we understand the Shahi
chronology then the seeming beneficence of offering citizenship to those of the chosen
religious denominations and states makes sense not as a humanitarian gesture,  but
rather as a way of smuggling the Hindu Rashtra in by the backdoor under the garb of a
law that does not explicitly say it discriminates against Muslims. First, the CAA will
offer citizenship to those who are deemed to fit into the Hindu Rashtra. Then the NRC
will  conveniently—under  the  garb  of  depoliticized  bureaucratic  neutrality  and
technicalities  such  as  possession  of  evidentiary  documents—eliminate  those  (read:
Muslims) that do not fit. The CAA does not make sense without the NRC and the NRC
could become dangerous to the ruling regime—because of the development of Assam-
like situations—without the CAA (Image 1). 
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The CAA-NRC chronology explained by a poster at Shaheen Bagh, December 2019.
20 Much like  the unmitigated disaster  that  was demonetization,  it  is  obvious  that  the
current government of India has not thought through what a process such as the NRC
will lead to. In all probability, it will quickly become a Frankenstein’s monster and spin
out of the control of the present regime. Assam is a perfect example of this.12 Muslims
would, undoubtedly, be prime victims in this battle of delineating who is Indian and
who is not. In addition, this prejudicial exercise would leave out many more types of
Indians, including those who are protected by the CAA. For instance, a poor, lower-
caste  Hindu  who  lives  in  central  India  and  cannot  trace  roots  back  to  Pakistan,
Bangladesh  or  Afghanistan  or,  more  accurately,  cannot  provide  documents  to  that
effect would also be in a highly precarious position. Given the generalized distrust of
documents and the improbability of physically having the types and full complement of
evidentiary documents that could/should convince officials of such a basic identity—
citizenship—the NRC is going to devour many more than its intended victims. In the
process, it will also open the floodgates to all forms of oppressive behavior by the local
state ranging from petty bribery to more insidious and overtly violent types of control.
The wicked CAA-NRC twins,  if  unleashed, will  divide and devour India in ways that
cannot  be  underestimated.  Together,  they  will  cause  suffering  of  a  peculiarly
bureaucratic form: by creating a suffocating paper-based reality of who is really an
Indian;  a  kaghazi  duniya  (world  of  paper)  we  will  struggle  to  be  part  of  and  find
impossible to escape—whether our names make their way into the register or not. NRC
se azadi is definitely a battle worth waging. 
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Countercurrents.org,  May  25.  Retrieved  on  November  27,  2020  (https://countercurrents.org/
2019/05/how-nrc-legitimised-xenophobia-and-chauvinism-in-assam/). 
4. This task of documenting the human fallouts of the NRC has been taken up by journalists such
as Rohini Mohan and Arunabh Saikia as well as research scholars like Suraj Gogoi. Scroll.in, for
instance, ran a series entitled “Humans of Assam” that showed the human costs of exclusion
from the NRC, thus moving beyond cold statistics to give a glimpse of the profound suffering this
sudden statelessness has caused.
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7. Ministry of Home Affairs.  2003.  “Notification.” December 10.  Retrieved November 27,  2020
(https://censusindia.gov.in/2011-Act&Rules/notifications/citizenship_rules2003.pdf).  Rule  4(4)
reads:  “During  the  verification  process,  particulars  of  such  individuals,  whose  Citizenship  is
doubtful,  shall  be  entered by the Local  Registrar  with appropriate  remark in the Population
Register for further enquiry and in case of doubtful 4 Citizenship, the individual or the family
shall be informed in a specified proforma immediately after the verification process is over.”
8. For instance, Prime Minister Modi claimed this in late December 2019 just days after the Home
Minister, Amit Shah, had made an announcement in Parliament rolling out nation-wide NRC.
(Mathew, Liz and Abhinav Rajput. 2019. “PM Narendra Modi: No Talk of NRC at All, Lies Being
Spread About Detention Centres.” The Indian Express, December 23. Retrieved on November 27,
2020  [https://indianexpress.com/article/india/pm-narendra-modi-citizenship-amendment-law-
nrc-bjp-campaign-delhi-6179940/]). 
9. See, for instance, this particular rendition of the slogan: Aisi Taisi Democracy. 2020. “Hum
Kaagaz Nahi Dikhaayenge.” YouTube video. Retrieved November 27, 2020 (https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=AISW4N6uGQA). 
10. Shivam Vij on Twitter, accessed November 27, 2020, https://twitter.com/DilliDurAst/status/
1207263602148724736?s=20
11. Venkataramakrishnan, Rohan. 2019. “Who is Linking Citizenship Act to NRC? Here are Five
Times Amit  Shah Did So.”  Scroll.in,  December 20.  Retrieved on November 27,  2020 (  https://
scroll.in/article/947436/who-is-linking-citizenship-act-to-nrc-here-are-five-times-amit-shah-
did-so). 
12. See Hasan on the ways in which the spectre of the CAA and NRC together is already affecting
life in neighbouring Meghalaya. (Hasan, Nafis. 2020. “CAA and NRC Stoke the Wrong Problems in
Meghalaya.” Journal of the Association for Political and Legal Anthropology, September 7. Retrieved on
November  27,  2020  [https://polarjournal.org/2020/09/07/caa-and-nrc-stoke-the-wrong-
problems-in-meghalaya/]). 
ABSTRACTS
This article considers the demands for azadi (freedom) from the National Register of Citizens
(NRC) that were central to the protests that swept through India over 2019-2020. It does so by
considering  the  processes  through which  such a  gargantuan bureaucratic  exercise  would  be
executed as well as through a consideration of its attachment to the Citizenship Amendment Act
(CAA). This leads to a conceptualization of the NRC as a “paper monster” possessed of the power
to divide and devour India. The article argues that the bureaucratic processes demanded by the
NRC would greatly exacerbate the violence of paperwork that lies at the heart of the Indian state.
The NRC will strengthen the longstanding dubiousness associated with all documents and can
only culminate in the creation of an alternate paper-based reality of who really is an Indian.
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